


226 100
Top Secret

25X1



Intelligence Memorandum

Jamaica: In Pursuit of Its National Identity

Top Secret

25X1

CI 76-10110C


April 28, 1976

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100270010-6

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100270010-6

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100270010-6



April 28, 1976

Jamaica: In Pursuit of Its National Identity

Summary

Nearly 16 years after its independence from Britain, Jamaica has reached a crossroads. A struggle is under way to determine the nature of the island's post-colonial identity. Prime Minister Manley's messianic commitment to bring about the social and economic assimilation of the black masses has pushed him steadily leftward. While claiming to be a democratic socialist, he has aroused fears that he has more revolutionary intentions. Manley has strongly identified his country's foreign policy with the Third World and has looked to Castro's Cuba for models and concepts of development as well as moral support in carrying out domestic reforms.



Beginning last summer after a trip to Havana, Manley accelerated the pace in his push toward a more militantly socialist society. He signaled his intention to strengthen his own base of support and at the same time demonstrated mounting impatience with those who would slow the process and with the democratic institutions that hamper his flexibility.


The means by which Manley seeks to achieve his vision of the new Jamaica—particularly the close ties he has fostered with Cuba and the independence he has allowed young militants in his own party—have caused a strong backlash, and as an election year begins he finds himself in serious political trouble. He has moved toward the center in recent weeks in an effort to recapture middle-class and business support. This task is complicated, however, by a need to placate the left wing of his party, by the momentum that has already developed in relations with Cuba, and by his own impatience to take another two steps forward in pursuit of his goals.

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100270010-6

25X1





Prime Minister Manley and his wife

Manley: Social Democrat or Revolutionary

"I must still confess to some confusion between my Manleys. You see, there is Prime Minister Manley the national and international leader, the man who can charm you off your feet, the man who can make you want to believe him and follow him and trust him. Then there is the other Mr. Manley, the partisan leader, the demagogue, who can do things on public platforms and before TV cameras to scare your pants off."

(Malcolm Sharp, *Daily Gleaner*
February 7, 1976)

At the center of the crossroads to which he has brought Jamaica is a man who has been aptly called "the most messianic figure in Jamaica's political history." Michael Manley is indeed a physically imposing man with enormous personal magnetism and charm, a spell-binding orator and rabble-rouser. He inherited his talents and his mission from his father, Norman Washington Manley, a former prime minister. One of the dominant personalities in twentieth century Jamaican history, the senior Manley led his country to independence from the British and gave the Jamaican masses political representation by creating the People's National Party. The father left it to his son to bring about the social and economic assimilation of the black majority.

A Fabian socialist by family background and education, with a 20-year history as a labor organizer, Manley was elected in February 1972 not on an ideological platform, but by exerting his charismatic appeal on the masses, exploiting the general sentiment of a need for change, and by nourishing the hope among the more conservative elements that he would not unduly upset the established order. Manley has since undertaken a halting quest to create for Jamaica's "sufferers" a more just society, generally at the expense of business interests and the middle class. Since the summer of 1973 he has held to a sharply leftward course, tacking temporarily when the reaction became too intense, only to set forth again after filling his ideological sails. He has come to see his place in history as tied inexorably to the third-world struggle for the creation of a socialist society at home and a new international economic order abroad.

Manley has been propelled leftward by his belief that in governing Jamaica he is sitting on a time bomb. He feels that if he does not succeed in alleviating the myriad social pressures he will not be able to hold the society together. He has ample cause for his concern. He inherited a society where, despite impressive economic growth in the decade after independence in 1962, a large portion of the numerically dominant black population remains poverty stricken, unemployed at the level of 23 percent, and ignored by Jamaica's power structure. By the 1970s a new generation was emerging that was growing increasingly impatient and more prone to turn to crime as a means of survival and an outlet for frustration. The 1970 census revealed that 45 percent of Jamaica's citizens were under 14 years of age, and Manley reasoned that they would not long tolerate the same conditions of poverty and government inattention.

A second factor thrusting Manley leftward is his own philosophical commitment to the construction of an egalitarian society. This commitment has struck a responsive chord among Jamaica's "sufferers," whose Old Testament - based culture has produced a century-old search for a leader to

deliver them from "Babylon." Manley takes seriously the appellation "Joshua" bestowed on him by his disciples. Like his biblical namesake, the successor to Moses who led the Israelites into the promised land, Manley has a powerful sense of mission. His pursuit of egalitarian solutions has made him something of a moral crusader—who sees the world in terms of good and evil—rather than the wily, calculating politician. This messianic zeal makes him, like the ideologue, less pragmatic and hence less predictable.

Manley is nevertheless subject to a number of restraining influences. He remains very much a product of the British-oriented creole elite and of a political culture that values democratic processes. He has misgivings about creating authoritarian institutions. He is also aware of economic realities and of Jamaica's dependence on a dynamic private sector, a prosperous tourist trade, a stable US market for its aluminum, and an attractive local climate for foreign investment.



"Joshua" the stump orator carrying his "Rod of Correction"

In addition, Manley confronts the reality of powerful domestic constraints opposing sweeping change. Jamaica's existing political and economic institutions still command the respect of a substantial portion of politically aware Jamaicans—at least of the older generation. A two-party system has been in operation since 1938, and both parties have substantial popular support. Unlike Forbes Burnham of Guyana, who has also embarked on a revolutionary course, Manley's opposition comes from his right, not his left. Commercial interests are well organized, and a lively and sophisticated press focuses public scrutiny on Manley's actions.

It is the tension between these pushes and constraints that accounts for Manley's vacillating behavior. Nevertheless, despite his frequent pauses, he has been moving cyclically but inexorably leftward. His drive to fulfill his commitment to Jamaica's disinherited black masses and the difficulties encountered in carrying out the task are tilting the balance and pushing him toward solutions that would threaten the rights and interests of the established society and the political opposition.

Manley Takes the Offensive

After he returned from a visit to Cuba last summer, Manley, by his rhetoric and action, began to hint at a more authoritarian approach. He sent shivers through the business community with his airport statement that there was no room for people who were "seeking palaces and wanting to become millionaires." Echoing a familiar Castro refrain, he "invited them to note that there are daily flights to Miami where there is a different kind of society in which they might feel more comfortable."

Clearly signalling that he intended to accelerate the move toward a militantly socialist society, Manley began a campaign to intensify the mobilization of his followers. In August, with a Cuban delegation looking on, he urged a conference of party youth, the "vanguard of socialism," to prepare themselves "as the future cadre and militants in building a socialist society." Then, in a speech in early October to a party gathering, Manley emphasized the need "to make sure that the People's National Party develops into a pure vehicle of democratic socialist purpose." He added: "We will not declare war on anybody, but in the pursuit of our just and noble objectives, once the overwhelming majority are behind us, we will not allow any minority interest to stand in our way."

The opposition's concern over Manley's intentions was heightened in November when his party used the full weight of its electoral machinery—including flagrant bully boy tactics—to run up impressive victories in several provincial elections. Ignoring the swirl of controversy that it had stirred up, the government introduced several pieces of legislation that—broadly


construed—would grant it sweeping powers to silence opponents. Finally, Manley capped his highly partisan reaction to the outbreak of political violence in the slums of West Kingston in January by announcing that he was creating a self-defense force within the party.

Two other factors greatly heightened the concern over Manley's intentions. The left wing of the People's National Party, and especially its youth arm, began to assume an increasingly high profile and seemed either to act with Manley's concurrence or to be beyond his control. Secondly, the stunning array of contacts with Cuba reinforced fears that Manley was going to follow Castro's example and take Jamaica down the road to authoritarian socialism.

The Cuban Tie

"The path of progress, the path of revolution, does not proceed in a straight line. Sometimes the road will turn. There will be obstacles. But our eyes are fixed on that mountain top. Our feet are marching on that road. And I want you to know that every step that you take you do not take alone, because the feet of the Jamaican people are marching beside yours. And one day, together, we will stand on that mountain top and we will look back down that road. We shall say: Together we have overcome."

Michael Manley
Havana, July 1975



Manley and Castro on the podium in Havana, July 1975

Fidel Castro has had a major and cumulative impact on Manley, reinforcing his own inclinations toward radical action. Manley feels a special kinship, a sense of moral affinity with Castro. While Manley publicly rejects Cuba's one-party system as inappropriate to Jamaica, the fact that Castro's approach has enabled him to bring order and progress to Cuba, to give the country and especially youth a sense of purpose and national pride, and to deal with the basic problems of underdevelopment has made a deep impression on Manley.

The two men first met when Manley decided to accept Castro's invitation to travel with him to the nonaligned conference in Algiers in September 1973. Manley, Castro, and Guyana's Forbes Burnham spent long hours closeted together aboard the Cuban prime minister's plane, and Manley later referred to the flight as "one of the great experiences of my life."


The flight came at a crucial stage in Manley's formation as a national leader. He had been in office about a year and a half and was beginning to comprehend the full scope of the economic and political constraints that inhibited solutions to Jamaica's massive social problems.

25X6

Manley found Cuba's experience in developing social programs, particularly in the fields of education, public health, and school and housing construction, as especially relevant to Jamaica. Manley was also impressed with a number of Cuban technical advances in such areas as agriculture and livestock, sugar cane technology, and commercial fishing. He turned to Cuba for help in these areas and received a prompt, enthusiastic response.

The Manley-Castro relationship deepened during the five-day visit the Jamaican prime minister made to Cuba last July. Manley struck the central theme of the visit in his keynote address by emphasizing that the two countries share a common destiny, and he noted that "we have only just commenced our struggle."

In March 1975, the first major technical cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed. It provided for 183 Jamaican youths to go to Cuba to study the use of community self-help in housing construction. During Manley's visit in July, technical cooperation was institutionalized



Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa (l) and his Jamaican counterpart Dudley Thompson (r) sign the economic, scientific, and technical agreement while Manley and Castro look on

with the establishment of a joint economic, scientific, and technical commission that is to meet semiannually. Since the commission's first meeting last November in Kingston, three projects are already being implemented while numerous others are in the planning stage.

The Cuban presence in Jamaica—in addition to an active embassy staff and a Prensa Latina office—totals 83 technical specialists including:

- A team of 20 Cubans who arrived in early February to build six microdams that will be used as models for a vast program of small dam construction to provide water to Jamaica's farmers.
- An advance party of 55 Cubans who arrived on February 10 to make final preparations for the building of a 500-student residential secondary school specializing in the training of agricultural technicians. The remaining members of what is to be a 250-man construction team are due to arrive soon.
- Eight specialists in the construction of prefabricated houses who are working in a project in the town of Falmouth. The team is expected to reach a total of 20.

Nothing could be more natural than Havana's approach toward the Manley government, which was reportedly institutionalized in a decision by the Cuban party's central committee in the fall of 1974 to give special attention in its Latin American policy to the countries of the Caribbean basin. Jamaica is undoubtedly seen as a country where Cuban support can have a considerable payoff: the government in power has shown an inclination to move leftward; the smallness and nearness of the island makes it particularly vulnerable to Havana's influence; Castro himself views Manley as a progressive leader willing to initiate a process of fundamental change; and Manley's personal disillusionment with traditional means and sources of development makes him susceptible to new ideas and models.

From its own experience the Cuban leadership realizes—and has undoubtedly preached to Manley—that to carry out a revolution and transform a society it is essential to create a strong party structure, to develop mass organizations, and to form a loyal security force. Havana would be eager to provide Manley with advice and support in these areas. The Cubans have already established the necessary personal relations and channels of communication to provide a rapid response whenever Manley turns to them for help.

Havana has been particularly active and successful in cultivating Jamaican youth groups. Its contacts with the youth arm of the People's National Party date to August 1974, and many of the leaders of that organization, including its director, Luis Castriota, are fervent advocates of close ties with Cuba. It is more than likely that the Cubans are already providing political training to some Jamaicans. The 183 Jamaican youths who were sent to Cuba last summer to work in housing construction were selected from Minister of Housing Anthony Spaulding's stable of party thugs, and at least a few of them can be expected to become grass-roots party organizers when they return.

The Cuban leadership's effort to develop ties with Manley's party has met with considerable receptivity. In June 1975 a Cuban party delegation headed by secretariat member Isidoro Malmierca visited Jamaica at the invitation of the People's National Party.

Last October Manuel Pineiro Losada, who in his capacity as head of the America Department of the party's central committee is responsible for determining Cuban policy toward the Western Hemisphere, attended the annual convention of Manley's party and sat beside the Jamaican prime minister as a guest of honor. Finally, two People's National Party representatives attended Cuba's party conference in December.

25X1



Wittingly or not, Manley and his radical associates have opened to the Cubans the classic avenues by which influence and eventually control can be exercised by one party or state over another. Starting at the top with the establishment of a flattering leader-to-leader relationship, the Cubans have built bridgeheads into the ruling party, [redacted] and the rising generation, and with their assistance programs they have laid the footings of a potential dependent relationship.

25X1

25X1

The Left Wing of the People's National Party

The left wing of the People's National Party consists mainly of a new generation of radicalized middle-class university graduates whose views reflect a mixture of Marxism and black power philosophy. Manley shares with them their conviction as to what ails Jamaica and has brought them into the party in hopes that he can plane the rough edges of their radicalism and use their energies for his own purposes. He reasons that if they remained outside the party they would be even harder to control and would compete with him for the allegiance of the urban poor.

Anthony Spaulding, the 42-year-old minister of housing, is the leading figure in the left wing of the party. He is a rough and tumble party boss representing a slum in West Kingston that is sandwiched between two housing projects loyal to the opposition. He has used the patronage his ministerial position affords to expand his political base. He directs a group of thugs known as the "Garrison Gang," that has been used to perform various strong-arm tasks for the party. Through his position as party vice president for youth affairs and through his friendship with Luis Castriota, the director of the youth arm of the party, Spaulding has developed a following among many of the young party militants.



Minister of Housing Anthony Spaulding

Spaulding has his eyes set on ruling Jamaica himself, but has not demonstrated the popular appeal he would need to compete with Manley outside his own constituency. In order to initiate the process of massive change he is willing to go along with Manley while continually pressuring him to take a more leftist tack.

In addition to Spaulding and Castriota, two other prominent members of the party's left wing are D. K. Duncan and Arnold Bertram. Duncan, the secretary general of the party, has used his position to install his black power friends at various levels of the party structure. Bertram, parliamentary secretary in the office of the Prime Minister, and like Duncan a former member of the staff of *Abeng*, a defunct black power publication, is the editor of the official party newspaper *New Nation*. He has used the journal to emphasize pro-Cuban and anti-US themes.

25X1

The party, under the leadership of Duncan and Bertram, last fall began to grow increasingly independent of Manley's control. Party leaders publicly advocated the creation of a one-party state and the end to any role for private enterprise. The racial overtones of many of the statements increased the panic of ethnic minorities who had already begun to emigrate at alarming rates. In January, political violence sparked by rival gangs affiliated with the People's National Party and the Jamaican Labor Party devastated entire city blocks in the slums of West Kingston. Manley's failure to get Spaulding to rein in his thugs reinforced the view that the prime minister was either unwilling or unable to control the left wing.

Manley is locked into a difficult and dangerous relationship with the left wing of his party. They need him because his charismatic personality makes it possible to attract a broad following to support a move to the left. He needs them because they are an important segment of the local leadership of the party. Norman Manley once expelled the leftists from the party, but for the junior Manley to follow suit would cost him vital support in the slums. In fact, the role of the left wing is likely to grow more, rather than less, important. The spectrum of the party has already shifted greatly to the left with the departure of several old guard members and can be expected to continue to do so as Manley follows his chosen path. He will have no place else to turn to find the dedicated manpower needed for the task of providing political education and political organization at the grass-roots level.

The Offensive Boomerangs

If Manley's goal is to enlarge his popular support and extend his mandate for change, his tactics have backfired. By signaling his intention to accelerate a move to the left while still in the early stages of organizing and politicizing his own followers, he has put his opponents on their guard and made easier their task of rallying elements of the society who oppose his brand of change. With elections due no later than May 1977, Manley sees his electoral prospects threatened by a series of difficulties.*

- The economy is a shambles, and he is vulnerable to charges of financial mismanagement.
- Political and criminal violence has brought parts of urban Jamaica to the verge of anarchy, and the government has proven largely ineffectual in dealing with it.
- The rapprochement with Cuba has polarized the society more than ever.

Manley's difficulties have given the Jamaican Labor Party new issues to exploit and thus a new lease on life. Its perception that its electoral chances have greatly improved, and the fear that Manley could use a second victory as a mandate for substantially revamping the electoral system, should be sufficient to enable the party to overcome the disunity that has plagued it for the past few years and give Manley a run for his money.

Manley's electoral base has been weakened but probably not enough to endanger his electoral chances. He has almost certainly lost the support of some middle class voters who traditionally vote for the People's National Party. In addition, the young businessmen and professionals who financed his last campaign have either switched their allegiance or are threatening to put their hands in their pockets and sit on them. This will make it more difficult for him to mount the sophisticated and costly media campaign that he conducted last time. Manley could be hurt in the rural areas as well. His party made significant inroads into the opposition's traditional rural base in 1972, but Manley's flirtation with Cuba could cost him the votes of some small farmers.

Manley will try to recoup his losses by consolidating his hold over the urban poor. His charisma may be somewhat diluted, but his opponents have no one who can match his magnetism. He can point to his record of instituting a major public works program, a minimum wage law, and legislation that will provide for the construction of public housing. While unemployment is nearly as high now as it was when Manley took office, and

**The constitutional life of parliament ends on the last day of February 1977, the fifth anniversary of Manley's election. A new election must be held within three months of the dissolution of parliament.*

the state of the economy will make it difficult for him even to maintain the public works program at its present level, by pointing to the political record of the opposition Manley should be able to convince the "sufferers" that he is their best hope. The critical question around which the election will probably turn will be the ability of Manley's party to secure a high electoral turnout of slum voters and to win a large percentage of the vote of the eighteen to twenty-one age bracket who are voting for the first time.

25X1

An important indication of the strength of the Cuban tie—or of Manley's confidence—will be the action he takes regarding the rumored visit of Fidel Castro. Although Castro was invited last July to visit Jamaica this year, no announcement has been made specifying the date when he will come. Manley has been preparing his followers for a Castro visit. At a public rally in Westmoreland parish on March 17, Manley asked the assembled party faithful if they wanted Castro to visit. Receiving the expected positive response, Manley said: "Then when my friend Fidel comes, I will be able to tell him the 10,000 people of Westmoreland are expecting to give him a warm welcome." Then during a ground-breaking ceremony for the Cuban School in mid-April, Manley spoke of "The reception Castro will get when he comes here later this year." The evidence argues for a Castro visit in advance of the elections. The logic of the situation—the political backlash already being suffered from the Cuban connection, the likelihood of the Cuban leader's becoming the object of a hostile demonstration even a physical attack—points equally strongly to a prudent postponement of the visit while Manley mends his electoral fences.

Manley is trying to preserve his party's broad appeal by reining in the left wing and reasserting his control.

25X1

After considerable hesitation, he also allowed the army to move into Spaulding's district to restore order and to enter a local party headquarters in a successful search for arms.

Manley will have to take care not to endanger his left-wing support. From outside the party the left has already signaled its dissatisfaction. In a speech in February, Trevor Munroe claimed that as long as Manley

remains on "the side of the people" the Workers' Liberation League will support him, but "if Manley gives in to the capitalists and turns against the people, then we will turn against him."

In order to appease the left and yet minimize the danger of frightening the middle class, Manley may choose multinational corporations as convenient targets for verbal blasts. (If he does adopt this tactic, however, his campaign rhetoric is not likely to carry over into the government's actual negotiating stance with the bauxite companies.) He will also continue his efforts to label the opposition as reactionaries. For example, in a recent speech he warned against sabotage being perpetrated in the sugar industry by "the enemies of the present democratic process."

Jamaica's current world-recession-induced economic plight—reflected in the fact that by mid-February foreign exchange reserves had plummeted in a little over six months from \$146 million to \$36 million—should serve as a restraint on Manley until after the election. In order to keep the economy afloat, he has been offering incentives to small businessmen and has privately tried to win the confidence of business. Some of the most respected capitalists in Jamaica still hold government and party positions and have ready access to and considerable influence with Manley. After the election, while it is possible that the starkness of Jamaica's economic problems could push him to make major concessions to the private sector, the political cost would probably be too great. Instead, the trend of events points to a growing estrangement between Manley and the private sector. In the climate of class antagonism that exists in Jamaica, and that Manley has helped to foster, it will be increasingly difficult to energize the private sector to expand investment and productive activity. Manley may thus be forced over time to accelerate the process of increasing government ownership.

The Manley government appears to be making some headway, especially with international organizations, in its desperate search for economic assistance. Jamaica obtained emergency balance-of-payments aid in the amount of \$29.2 million from the International Monetary Fund's oil facility mechanism and availed itself of the IMF's gold tranche. The World Bank is studying several new loans totaling at least \$45 million that would promote rural and urban development and is considering Jamaica for an ambitious pilot program aimed at tackling the problem of urban unemployment. The Inter-American Development Bank is examining a request for a \$20-million industrial credit loan. In addition, smaller loans have been offered by Kuwait and the Caribbean Development Bank.

Jamaica has begun to turn to some of the more radical nonaligned countries and to Eastern Europe in its efforts to expand its markets, acquire technology, and decrease its economic dependence on the US. In March,

Hungary reportedly agreed to construct an alumina plant in Jamaica, and Algeria signed an agreement for the future yearly delivery of 150,000 tons of Jamaican alumina. Diplomatic relations were established with Libya in February, and the Qadhafi government agreed to send a delegation to Kingston soon to promote economic and technical cooperation. In addition, Romania is said to be interested in supplying equipment and machinery for a Jamaican oil refinery that is still in the planning stage. Apparently in an effort to offset Cuban influence, the Chinese have reportedly offered to sell Jamaica a textile factory on very favorable terms.

US Interests

The US has a considerable economic stake in Jamaica with investments totaling about \$1 billion. This country receives over half of its bauxite and nearly one quarter of its alumina from Jamaica. US investment in the Jamaican bauxite and alumina industry is about \$660 million, 70 percent of which is insured by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

Realizing the need for the US market, Manley and his negotiators, who include some of the finest minds from the Jamaican commercial establishment, have dealt judiciously with the six North American aluminum companies (five US, one Canadian) that dominate the industry. Despite his campaign rhetoric about making the companies more responsive to the island's needs, it was not until the winter of 1973-74 brought the dramatic rise in oil prices that the government began to pressure the companies to renegotiate their contracts. In June 1974, Jamaica broke off negotiations and increased the export tax on bauxite by 500 percent. The tax has been crucial to the island's economic survival and now accounts for over 30 percent of government revenues.

Shortly after the imposition of the bauxite tax, the government began the process of acquiring majority ownership in the aluminum companies. In October 1974, provisional agreements were reached with Kaiser, and in the following months with Reynolds and Revere, that called for the government to purchase ownership of 51 percent of the mining operation over a 10-year period. Discussions are under way with the largest company, Alcoa, that will presumably set the pattern for the final agreement with all the companies. The government has been in no hurry to make a final settlement, presumably because it lacks the revenue to purchase equity participation.

The aluminum companies are apparently quite willing to sell controlling interest to the Jamaican government, and some may not even object to being bought out completely. Their major concern is to maintain access to Jamaica's bauxite. While there are other countries from which the US could increase the purchase of bauxite, it would require costly changes in the US bauxite reduction plants.

Renegotiation of contracts with the various companies is going on, with indications that both sides are willing to make concessions on the bauxite tax. Soon after the tax was imposed, three of the companies took their protest to the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), but Manley has adamantly refused to accept arbitration. Alcoa and Reynolds decided several months ago to hold their claims in abeyance pending a satisfactory conclusion to the contract renegotiations. Only Revere—the company with the smallest holdings—continues to pursue its case and has even lodged a claim with OPIC. For its part, the government has recently dropped its insistence that the companies pay taxes based on a prescribed minimum level of production and has settled for basing the tax on the amount of ore actually mined.

The government has been put in a difficult bargaining position because of the depressed state of the bauxite industry. Bauxite and alumina export earnings dropped by 20 percent in 1975 and prospects remain bleak for this year. Reduced aluminum demand forced Revere to close down its alumina refinery, and other companies have had to lay off workers or shorten working hours. As the bauxite industry recovers from its current depressed state, Manley will be encouraged to drive a hard bargain with the companies, especially on the issue of minimum production levels. This issue could become particularly delicate if the government thinks the companies are cutting back production in Jamaica disproportionately to cutbacks in other countries where they have operations.

Relations between Jamaica and the US seem to be growing gradually but perceptibly more distant. There is a growing fear among many members of the ruling party, not confined to but certainly fueled by the left wing, that the US is involved in trying to “destabilize” the Manley government. Signs have appeared all over Kingston linking the Jamaican Labor Party leader Edward Seaga with the CIA. Recent articles in the US press stressing Jamaica's ties with Cuba are seen as part of the destabilization effort. Members of Manley's party have reportedly become more reluctant to be seen with US embassy personnel. There is a growing sentiment of fundamental disagreement with the US on many issues of major importance



Labor Party leader Edward Seaga

to Jamaica including the creation of a new international economic order and the liberation of southern Africa.

Outlook

Manley rode to victory by harnessing the dependable cart horse of the commercial elite to the hungry lion of the masses. Four years later, the lion is stronger and hungrier, and the cart horse may be ready to bolt. To stay in power and achieve his dream of prosperity and independence for all Jamaicans, Manley has three possible approaches:

- win the support and votes of both the moneyed elite and the radical unemployed.
- contest the elections on a straight radical-versus-conservatives campaign.
- abandon constitutionalism and take the revolutionary route to power.

Manley's behavior thus far points to the first option as his preferred course. To regain the confidence of his former middle-class backers without forfeiting his left-wing support will be a real test of Manley's leadership ability. He will probably be able to muddle through, however, and be re-elected although by a much smaller margin than in 1972. Left-wingers in the party will put continual pressure on him, but as long as he does not move too sharply to the center they are likely to see the long-run prospects as being better served by working for his re-election than by splintering the party and leaving the field to the opposition. While Manley's support from business and the middle class has eroded markedly, the point of no return has not been reached, and Manley is actively courting the favor of the commercial elite—apparently with some success.

Despite Manley's preference for the first option, the danger exists that the relationship with Cuba may already have acquired sufficient momentum to make a reconciliation with the middle-class/moneyed-elite branch of his coalition impossible to achieve even through the election period. If Manley judges that to be the case, he would then be driven toward the second option. In that event Manley would have to mortgage himself to the strong-arm methods of the ultra-radicals and the second option could give way to the third. Though Manley's constitutionalist roots are still strong enough to allow him to accept honorable defeat, this is not true of the left-wing party leaders, and their efforts to steal the election or seize it by force could either mark the end of Westminster democracy in Jamaica or produce bloody civil strife.

Key Dates in Cuban-Jamaican Relations Before July 1975

December 8, 1972	Jamaica establishes diplomatic relations with Cuba.
September 3, 1973	Jamaican Prime Minister Manley departs Trinidad along with Guyana's Forbes Burnham en route to the Algiers nonaligned conference aboard Fidel Castro's personal plane.
December 25, 1973 - January 4, 1974	Three members of the Jamaican Defense Force visit Cuba for the celebration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution.
January 13-19, 1974	Foreign Minister Dudley Thompson leads a trade mission of Jamaican businessmen and government officials on a trip to Cuba to discuss prospects for increased commerce between the two countries.
January 23, 1974	Cuban ambassador Ramon Pez Ferro presents his credentials to the Jamaican government. He is noted as the youngest member of the group that accompanied Castro in his attack on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953.
August 2, 1974	Minister of Agriculture Keble Munn leads a delegation to discuss Havana's experience in the areas of agriculture and livestock. Fidel Castro personally receives the group.

25X1

August 30, 1974	Jamaica's first ambassador to Cuba, Lloyd Barnett, presents his credentials in Havana.
-----------------	--

25X1

October 22, 1974 Jamaican Minister of Housing Anthony Spaulding makes his first visit to Cuba to discuss the building of low-cost housing.

October 30, 1974 An air service agreement is signed between Cuba and Jamaica calling for the weekly Cubana airlines flight to land in Jamaica proceeding to and returning from the eastern Caribbean. The Cubana flights begin on December 18, 1974.

March 19, 1975 A Cuban delegation headed by Levi Farah, the Minister of Development of Social and Livestock-Agricultural Construction (DESA), begins a one-week visit to Jamaica that terminates in the signing of an agreement with the ministry of housing. It provides for Jamaican youths to study construction techniques in Cuba and for Cuba to send a technical mission to assemble a prefabricated housing plant in Jamaica.

April 14, 1975 A Cuban agricultural delegation headed by Cuban National Institute of Agrarian Reform vice president Daniel Solana Pinera visits Jamaica to learn about the state of Jamaican agriculture.

May 7, 1975 Thirty-three Jamaican youths, headed by PNP youth leader Sheldon McDonald, arrive in Cuba where they are to spend a year at the Alamar housing project near Havana.

June 5, 1975 The Castro government opens a Prensa Latina office in Kingston headed by Godefroid Tchamlesso.

June 20, 1975 Isidoro Malmierca, a member of the secretariat of the Cuban Communist Party, leads a delegation to Jamaica invited by the PNP.

July 1, 1975 Jamaica sends a second youth contingent to Camaguey (bringing the total to 183) to study housing construction techniques.

Cuba-Jamaica: Exchange of High-Level Government and Party Delegations and Technical Assistance Missions Since Prime Minister Manley's Visit to Cuba, July 9-13, 1975.

July 20, 1975	A delegation from Cuba's Union of Communist Youth attends the annual conference of PNP youth.
July 24, 1975	Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade Marcelo Fernandez Font arrives in Jamaica to discuss the use of Kingston as a transshipment port for ships bound to and from Cuba.
Early August 1975	Cuban Political Bureau member Guillermo Garcia visits Jamaica on an unofficial mission and meets with Manley. He is accompanied by Cuban Minister of Merchant Marine and Ports Joel Chaveco Hernandez.
August 20, 1975	Four Cuban experts in water engineering and irrigation arrive to conduct a two-week site survey for future microdams.
September 24, 1975	A Cuban delegation headed by Aldo Margolles Duenas, the deputy director of the National Institute of Fisheries, begins a week of talks in Jamaica concerning fishing research and the training of Jamaicans in fishing and boat building.
October 23, 1975	Manuel Pineiro Losada, head of the America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, attends the annual PNP conference in Kingston.
November 3, 1975	A delegation headed by Foreign Minister Dudley Thompson represents Jamaica at the conference in Havana of the Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee under ECLA sponsorship.
November 11-17, 1975	The Joint Cuba/Jamaica Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation meets for the first time in Kingston. Heading the two delegations are DESA director Farah

and Jamaican Foreign Minister Thompson. The protocol covers agreements on construction, agriculture, sugar industry, fisheries, trade, tourism, public health, and maritime and air transportation,

November 18, 1975

Jamaican Minister of Youth and Community Development Douglas Manley (the brother of the prime minister) begins a week's visit to Cuba where he meets with deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Carlos Rafael Rodriguez as well as with officials from the Union of Communist Youth, the Youth Labor Army, DESA, and the National Institute of Sports, Physical Education, and Recreation.

November 20, 1975

Jamaican Minister of Health and Environmental Control Kenreth McNeil leads a delegation of some 30 members on a tour of Cuban public health facilities.

Early December 1975

A group of eight Cuban construction specialists apparently arrives in Jamaica to help set up a prefabricated housing plant in Falmouth that will be capable of producing 400 houses a year.


25X1

January 20, 1976

Three Cuban rice experts begin a two-week visit to study and make recommendations concerning the Jamaican rice industry.

January 21, 1976

Jamaican Minister of Education Howard Cooke heads a team of 14 officials on a tour of Cuban education facilities; he is received by President Dorticos.



25X1

January 1976

Jamaican students reportedly go to Cuba to learn commercial fishing methods and to observe the organization of the Cuban fishing industry.

February 3, 1976

A team of 20 Cuban technicians arrives to build the first microdams.

February 10, 1976

A 55-man advance contingent of Cubans comes to Jamaica to begin work on a residential "school in the countryside" near Twickenham Park. The group is eventually to number at least 250, but the arrival of the remaining members has been delayed by legal action initiated by anti-Cuban provincial officials.



25X1



25X1

March 26, 1976

The Director of Havana's psychiatric hospital, Dr. Eduardo Ordaz, visits to advise on the development of Jamaica's mental health program.

March 29, 1976

Minister of Housing Spaulding heads a Jamaican delegation that meets with Levi Farah and other DESA officials to discuss future cooperation in the construction field. This could entail sending additional Jamaican youth to Cuba to learn construction techniques.

April 1, 1976


Jamaican Minister of Industry, Tourism, and Commerce P. J. Patterson visits Cuba, where he meets with President Dorticos, Foreign Trade Minister Fernandez Font, and the director of the National Institute of Tourist Industry, Vivian Colls.

Future Events



25X1

- The next meeting of the Joint Cuba/Jamaica Commission of Economic Scientific, and Technical Cooperation should be held this summer.
- Fidel Castro was invited last July to visit Jamaica this year.



25X1

25X1

Top Secret



Top Secret